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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 
v. : Court of Appeals No. 890396-CA 
KEELEY L. ROWE, : Category No. 13 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the majority of the court of appeals erroneously 
interpret federal law and ignore Utah law by concluding that the 
mere status of being a "party guest" in a third-party's home 
"vests" the guest with standing to challenge a search of the home? 
Did the majority decision adopt, in effect, a "legitimately on the 
premises" test for standing in conflict with federal and Utah case 
law? 
2. Did the majority of the court of appeals erroneously 
conclude that the state must prove abandonment by "clear, 
unequivocal and decisive evidence;" and did the majority 
erroneously apply a subjective standard in evaluating whether 
abandonment occurred by improperly requiring the state to prove 
that defendant did not abandon the property "to avoid self-
incrimination? " 
3. Did the majority of the court of appeals ignore Utah 
precedent and erroneously conclude that the "exclusionary rule" is 
applicable to a procedural violation of the nighttime search 
warrant provision, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5 (1990)? Did the 
majority of the court of appeals ignore Utah and federal case law 
and erroneously conclude, without factual support, that the 
officers acted in bad faith in executing contemporaneously a search 
warrant for a home with their valid nighttime arrest warrant of its 
owner? 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' opinion sought to be reviewed is 
State v. Keelev Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah Ct. App. Feb. 8, 
1991), a copy of which is contained in the addendum to this 
petition. 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
On February 8, 1991, the court of appeals issued its 
split decision reversing the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence . The state timely filed requests for 
and was granted a stay of remittitur by the court of appeals and an 
extension of time in which to file this petition by the Utah 
Supreme Court. This Court has jurisdiction to consider the 
petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990) and 
§ 78-2a-4 (1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of any provisions upon which the state 
relies is included in the body of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Keeley Laursen Rowe, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 
(b)(ii) (1990) (R. 10). 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence 
seized pursuant to a search warrant executed on a third-party's 
home (R. 28-31, 32-41). On March 17, 1989, the court entered a 
written order denying the motion (R. 60-1). 
A bench trial commenced on March 21, 1989 (R. 50, 62-65). 
During trial, defendant renewed her motion to suppress (T. 7-8, 
104-05). The trial court denied the motion (T. 108). Defendant 
was convicted as charged (R. 65, T. 181). Defendant directly 
appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 85-6). 
The matter was orally argued to the court of appeals on 
June 13, 1990. On February 8, 1991, the court of appeals, in a 
split decision, reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to 
suppress on the basis that the search warrant, for the third-party 
home in which defendant was a party guest, was defective for having 
authorized a nighttime search. Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14. 
The majority found that exclusion of any evidence seized was 
mandated and reversed defendant's conviction. Ld. at 17. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The state accepts the statement of the facts contained in 
the opinion of the court of appeals with the following additions. 
On October 6, 1989, a confidential informant told the 
police that Stan Swickey, the individual whose home was 
subsequently searched, had a large quantity of methamphetamine and 
marijuana at his home in Leeds, Utah, and had offered to sell the 
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informant whatever he wanted (R. 56-7; T. 12). Based on this 
information and prior police monitored drug purchases from Swickey, 
an arrest warrant for Swickey and a search warrant for his home 
were obtained on the night of October 7, 1989 (T. 9-12, 14). The 
search warrant authorized the officers to execute it at night and 
without announcing their presence (R. 57).1 Within a few hours, 
the officers entered the Swickey home to arrest Mr. Swickey and 
execute the search warrant (T. 15, 18). 
Upon entering the home, the officers unexpectedly 
encountered eight other individuals in the home for what appeared 
to be a gambling party (T. 16). Defendant was standing in the 
kitchen and the others were seated around a table in the living 
room (T. 16, 21). Drugs were in plain view in a cup on the living 
room table (T. 26, 57-8, 126).2 The officers arrested Swickey 
pursuant to the arrest warrant and informed him of the search 
warrant (T. 17, 22). 
The remaining party guests, including defendant, were 
told that they were free to leave the premises (T. 30). Defendant 
asked if she could get her shoes. An officer accompanied her to 
the bedroom, where 
[fjrom a pile of clothing next to the file 
cabinet she — in which this purse was a part 
of that pile, she removed her shoes in that 
1
 The substantive validity of the search warrant has not been 
challenged at trial or on appeal. The only issues raised relate to 
the warrant's authorization of a no-knock and nighttime entry. 
2
 Edwin Davis was arrested for possession of the drugs in his 
cup. He was tried with defendant and convicted of the lesser 
included offense of resorting (T. 181). 
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pile. In that pile there were some pants, 
some women's temple garments, several other 
items. She picked those up and her shoes up, 
and I asked her, "Is that everything of yours 
in this room? She said that was, and exited 
the room and we permitted her to leave. 
(T. 30-31). 
After defendant left, the officers conducted the search 
of the home (T. 31, 44). Drugs were found throughout the house, 
including a pile of methamphetamine on the dresser in the room from 
which defendant retrieved her shoes. A vial of methamphetamine was 
found in the purse on the floor. When subsequently questioned by 
the police, defendant stated that she had been "ripping off" 
Swickey during the party by filling the vial from the supply of 
methamphetamine on the dresser without Swickey's knowledge and 
without payment to him (T. 35, 49). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE STATUS OF BEING AN INVITED GUEST 
CONFERS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF 
A SEARCH WARRANT FOR A THIRD PARTY HOME. 
At trial and on appeal, the state argued that defendant 
lacked standing to challenge the adequacy of the search warrant for 
the Swickey home since she was only a party guest in the home. 
Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14; Br. of Appellee at 6-12. In a 
split decision rejecting this argument, a majority of the court of 
appeals concluded that 
defendant's status as an invited guest in the 
home vested her with a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the home and she thereby gained 
sufficient standing to challenge the validity 
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of the search warrant and the resulting 
search. 
Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. Despite the court's use of the 
accepted terminology of "reasonable expectation of privacy," the 
majority's opinion amounts to no more than an application of the 
formerly rejected "legitimately on the premises" test for standing 
and is, therefore, in conflict with federal and Utah case law. 
Defendant did not produce any evidence that she had a 
greater expectation of privacy in the home than any of the other 
seven party guests present when the police entered the home (T. 30-
31, 96-97, 105-107) . The court of appeals agreed that defendant 
was simply an invited social guest in the home and that there was 
no evidence that "would lead to the conclusion that she intended, 
or might have been invited, to remain overnight on the night of the 
search." Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. 
In concluding that this "invited guest" status was 
sufficient to establish standing, the majority relied exclusively 
on Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S.Ct. 1684 (1990), and Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).3 In Olson, the Supreme Court held 
that an overnight guest had a sufficient expectation of privacy in 
his host's home such that an arrest warrant was required to enter 
3
 Rawlings, citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), 
reaffirms that the proper test for standing is whether the 
aggrieved party had a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the 
area searched. 448 U.S. at 104. While the court of appeals 
determined the issue of standing solely on federal law, it is clear 
that Utah cases have consistently applied the Rakas standard. State 
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990); State v. Iacono, 725 
P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah 1986); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 
1335 (Utah 1984). 
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home); Crisp v. State, 195 Ga.App. 786, 395 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1990) 
(mere presence in a hotel room when it is searched is insufficient 
to establish any expectation of privacy); People v. Harris, 797 
P.2d 816, 817 (Colo. App. 1990) (a social guest, as opposed to an 
overnight guest, does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the host's apartment). See also United States v. Donnes, 752 
F.Supp 411, 417 (D.Wyo. 1990) (a defendant who had lived in the 
searched home continuously for several months, had left furniture 
and belongings in it, and had padlocked the home when he left it 
sometime prior to the search, had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy to contest its search); People v. Murray, 565 N.Y.Supp.2d 
212, 213 (A.D.2 Dept. 1991) (a defendant had standing to challenge 
his warrantless arrest in his girlfriend's apartment where he was 
spending the night); People v. Olson, 198 111.App.3d 675, 144 
111.Dec. 806, 556 N.E.2d 273, 276-77 (1990) (a defendant who was 
sleeping in a bed in his underwear had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in another's hotel room); State v. Carter, 22 Conn.App. 
118, 576 A.2d 572, 574-75 (1990) (a defendant who was "clearly more 
than a transient houseguest" had standing to challenge the search 
of his host's apartment); State v. Corpier, 793 S.W.2d 430, 436-37 
(Mo. App. 1990) (a defendant who spent three to four nights a week 
at a friend's apartment for "liaisons with his girlfriend" was more 
than a casual guest or visitor and so had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the apartment); State v. Tapio, 459 N.W.2d 406, 413 
(S.D. 1990) (a defendant had standing to challenge the search of 
his girlfriend's trailer in which he was spending the night); State 
-8-
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characteristics of overnight stays-, such as 
showering, changing clothes, and the use of 
toilet facilities, the distinction is really 
more one of degree than of kind. For example, 
the seclusion extended to a parent who pauses 
to feed or diaper an infant while visiting 
friends implies a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, although the visit might be a short 
one, and certainly less than an overnight 
stay. Visitors of comparatively short 
duration may nap, change, u&t the toilet, or 
dine without any expectation of interference 
from, the world at large. * T this case, 
defendant felt secure enoug, the home to 
remove her shoes, leave hex purse beyond her 
view, and roam to rooms other than where her fellow guests were playing cards. 
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not uncommon for any individuals familiar with each other in a 
home, especially when the apparent purpose of the gathering was to 
casually gamble, drink and use drugs (T. 16). Further, the court's 
conclusion that defendant left her purse in the bedroom because she 
"felt secure" in the home is inconsistent with the evidence. By 
defendant's own admission, she was using the purse to secrete the 
drugs which she was stealing from her host throughout the evening 
(T. 35). By having the purse in the bedroom, she could more easily 
accomplish her illegal activities since the methamphetamine she was 
stealing was located on the dresser in the bedroom (T. 35). A 
legitimate expectation of privacy cannot be justified by subjective 
hopes of concealing illegal conduct. Rakas v. Illinois, 4 39 U.S. 
128, 143 n.12 (1978). 
The only distinction alluded to by the majority, between 
defendant and the other party guests, is that defendant and Swickey 
had an "intimate relationship" in the past "which may have 
continued to the time" of the search. Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
15. But, the fact that such a relationship may have existed at 
some time remote from the search is not relevant to the inquiry of 
whether defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
Swickey's home on the night in question. "Any other conclusion 
would result in an overnight guest's having a permanently protected 
fourth amendment interest in a place he or she once stayed, no 
matter how remote in time." State v. Cortis, 465 N.W.2d at 139. 
It is defendant who has the burden of establishing facts 
supporting her claim of standing. Society of Prof. Journalists v. 
-10-
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POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT EVIDENCE OF ABANDONMENT MUST BE 
ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE; 
AND ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED A SUBJECTIVE STANDARD 
BY REQUIRING THAT "ABANDONMENT IN THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT SENSE" COULD ONLY BE ESTABLISHED IF 
THE STATE PROVED THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT 
ABANDON THE PROPERTY TO "AVOID SELF-
INCRIMINATION." 
While a party guest would not have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the host's home, a guest could retain a 
reasonable privacy interest in the guest's personal possessions in 
the home. Here, the state argued that any legitimate expectation 
of privacy which defendant may have had in her purse, was abandoned 
by defendant disclaiming ownership of it and leaving it on the 
floor in the bedroom when she left the home prior to the police 
commencing their search. 
In rejecting the state's argument, the majority concluded 
that the state must prove that a defendant abandoned any legitimate 
expectation of privacy by "clear, unequivocal and decisive 
evidence." While the issue is one of first impression in Utah, the 
state would submit that the better and more consistent standard of 
proof would be proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Only a minority of jurisdictions have directly determined 
the standard of proof applicable to a determination of 
abandonment.4 The court of appeals relied on Friedman v. United 
A
 The same holds true in evaluating standing. While Utah 
clearly places the burden of establishing standing on a defendant, 
no Utah case articulates the standard of proof. This omission 
appears to be common in other jurisdictions as well. 
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a subjective determination, it is in conflict with the 
overwhelmingly accepted view that 
the test to be applied in determining whether 
a person has abandoned property is an 
objective one - the words used, the conduct 
exhibited, and other objective facts such as 
where and for what length of time the property 
is relinquished and the condition of the 
property. 
O'Shauqhnessv v. State, 420 So.2d 377, 379 (Fla.App. 1982).6 
Accord United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 859 (1983); United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 
199, 201 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982); United 
States v. Walker, 624 F.Supp. 99, 101 (D.Md. 1985). 
While the majority opinion correctly stated that proof of 
abandonment is a factual determination "inferred from 'words 
spoken, acts done, and other objective facts,'" a consideration of 
the court's second false predicate makes clear that the majority 
erroneously applied a subjective standard in assessing abandonment. 
In concluding that the state failed to carry its burden of proof, 
the court considered defendant's denial of ownership of the purse 
and then stated: 
5
 The language quoted is dicta contained in a footnote 
discussing the issue of the voluntariness of an abandonment 
occurring in the context of prior illegal police conduct. Narian, 
556 A.2d at 1161 n.4. Narian has not been cited or approved by any 
other court. 
6
 The court of appeals cited O'Shaughessy but only in support 
of its conclusion that a clear and convincing standard of proof was 
appropriate. 
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Certiorari is appropriate on this issue as the Rowe 
decision determines, as a matter of first impression in Utah, that 
abandonment must be established by clear and convincing evidence in 
light of the subjective intent of the defendant. This presents an 
important question of law which should be settled by this Court. 
Additionally, based on the facts of this case, the majority's 
conclusion that defendant did not abandon her privacy interests "so 
far depart[s] from the accepted and usual course of judicial" 
analysis as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of 
supervision." Utah R. App. P. 46. 
POINT III 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED, IN 
CONFLICT WITH UTAH PRECEDENT, THAT THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE WAS APPLICABLE TO A 
PROCEDURAL VIOLATION OF THE NIGHTTIME SEARCH 
WARRANT PROVISION, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-5 
(1990). 
Both at trial and on appeal, defendant's only claim of 
error in regards to the Swickey search warrant was that the 
affidavit did not contain a sufficient basis to authorize either 
the no-knock entry or the nighttime search.7 The majority of the 
appellate panel upheld the lower court's determination that 
sufficient justification existed for an unannounced entry; but, the 
appellate court overruled the magistrate's conclusion that a 
nighttime search was permissible. Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13-
14. 
7
 Defendant also claimed that the search warrant contained the 
wrong date. Both the trial and appellate courts summarily 
discounted this argument. 
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The concern of the statutory entry requirements is to 
minimize the invasion of privacy which has already been authorized 
by the issuance of the search warrant. State v. Buck, 756 P. 2d 
700, 703 (Utah 1988) (no-knock provision violation did not require 
suppression where the violation did "not contribute to the invasion 
of privacy"). Here, a greater invasion of privacy would have 
occurred if the officers had validly arrested Swickey at night, but 
secured his home until dawn when the search warrant could have been 
executed. Such delay a would not have preserved any constitutional 
rights, nor served any practical usefulness. .Id. at 702-03; State 
v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1367 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 
P.2d 1277 (1987). 
The court of appeals' conclusion that written 
noncompliance with the nighttime search provisions requires 
suppression of the evidence ignores Utah precedent and is in 
conflict with federal law. State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1368-69 
(Utah 1987) (despite an officer clearly acting outside of his 
statutory geographical authority, suppression is "a remedy out of 
all proportion to the benefits gained to the end of obtaining 
justice while preserving individual liberties unimpaired"). Accord 
United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d at 1125 (violation of nighttime 
provision is procedural and does not require suppression; cited 
with approval in Fixel), United States v. Shelton, 742 F.Supp. 
1491, 1502-03 (D.Wyo. 1990) (violation of nighttime search 
provision is statutory and does not require suppression; citing 
Fixel as being in accord). See also State v. Ford, 801 P.2d. 754, 
-18-
764-66 (Or. 1990) (failure to comply with no-knock statutory 
provision was excusable and did not violate the federal or state 
constitution); Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396, 490 A.2d 421, 
423-24 (1985) (suppression not appropriate remedy for technical 
violations of procedural rules governing the execution of search 
warrants); State v. Brock, 294 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 547 (1982) 
(suppression not required for violation of nighttime search 
provisions); Commonwealth v. Musi, 486 Pa. 102, 404 A.2d 378, 
384-85 (1979) (suppression not required for violation of procedural 
rules governing execution and return on search warrant). 
The majority also concluded that the officers in question 
had acted in bad faith in executing the search warrant at night.9 
For purposes of this petition, the state will not fully brief this 
issue but asserts that the conclusion that the officers acted in 
bad faith reliance on the nighttime authorization for the search is 
in conflict with the standards enunciated in State v. Fixel, 744 
P.2d at 1368-69, and the cases cited therein. 
9
 Despite Judge Orme's appendix to the Rowe opinion in which 
he questions the propriety of a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule, the court did not consider any state 
constitutional issue of good faith. Rather, the majority opinion 
is solely predicated on the federal criteria of United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
However, the state would submit that other than the "bad 
faith" aspects enunciated in Fixel and the cases cited therein, a 
Leon-type analysis would only be applicable if this Court found 
that the violation in this case was of constitutional magnitude 
such that exclusion of the evidence could be considered. 
Otherwise, the remedy for a procedural violation is limited to 
"official sanctions, discipline, and/or civil and criminal 
liability." Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1369. 
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The majority opinion's conclusion, that a violation of 
the entry requirements for execution of a search warrant is of 
constitutional magnitude and "mandates" suppression, ignores and is 
in direct conflict with Utah precedent• As such, it is appropriate 
for review by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the state respectfully 
requests this Court grant the petition for writ of certiorari. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Q//~> day of April, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney Gerlejral 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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N.E, 122, 123 (1929); Davis v. Davis, 86 Okla. 255, 
257, 207 P. 1065, 1066 (1922). We believe, however, 
that this position is unnecessary and substantially 
conflicts with the purposes of the UUPC. 
3. If the trial court hears disputed evidence on the 
question of the decedent's signatory intent, the 
reviewing court should defer to the trial court's 
findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. See In re 
Yowell's Estate, 75 Utah 312, 329, 285 P. 285, 294 
(1930); see also Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. 
FinUnson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 8%, 899 
(Utah 1989); In re Estate of BarteU, 776 P.2d 885, 
886 (Utah 1989). 
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ORME, Judge: 
Defendant appeals her conviction of posse-
ssion of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-
37-8(2)(a)(i), (b)(ii) (1989). We reverse. 
FACTS 
On October 7, 1988, a search warrant was 
issued and executed which authorized police to 
search for narcotics in the residence of Stan 
Swickey in Leeds, Utah. The warrant conta-
ined provisions which allowed police to enter 
"day or n ight / and to effect the search 
without notice, i.e., on a "no-knock" basis. 
The warrant was issued based on information 
in the officer's supporting affidavit that a 
confidential informant had been contacted by 
Swickey, who told the informant that he, 
Swickey, had picked up a quantity of metha-
mphetamine and marijuana that was being 
stored at his home in Leeds. The affidavit in 
support of the warrant contained preprinted 
language which stated that the affiant reaso-
nably believed that the property sought could 
be easily destroyed or hidden or that harm to 
officers could result from notice. Following 
this language are two boxes that the affiant 
can check, and which were checked, to request 
nighttime and "no-knock" authority. No 
other factual information supports these req-
uests. 
The warrant was executed on a "no-
knock" basis on October 7, 1988,1 at approx-
imately 11:30 p.m. When police entered 
Swickey's apartment, they found eight people, 
in addition to Swickey, in the home. Everyone 
except defendant was in the living room 
playing cards around a table. Defendant was 
in the kitchen. After securing the home, the 
officers had defendant join the other people in 
the living room, while Swickey was taken into 
the kitchen and placed undeT arrest, pursuant 
to an arrest warrant, and advised of the search 
warrant. Another individual was arrested when 
the officers saw drugs nearby, in plain view. 
The remaining individuals, including defen-
dant, were told they could leave the premises. 
Defendant did not have her shoes, and asked 
if she could go to the bedroom to retrieve 
them. An officer accompanied her to the 
room, where she took the shoes from a pile of 
items. The officer asked her if she had every-
thing that was hers from that room. Defen-
dant replied that she did. 
After defendant left, the officers conducted 
a search of the home. Narcotics were found 
throughout the house. A purse was seized 
from the pile in the bedroom from which 
defendant had retrieved her shoes. Inside the 
purse was a small brown vial which contained 
methamphetamine. Also in the purse were 
several documents that revealed that the purse 
belonged to defendant. 
Police contacted defendant the next day and 
advised her that they had a purse that belo-
nged to her. She came down to the station and 
was arrested. After being advised of her Miran-
da rights, defendant admitted that the 
purse and vial of drugs were hers. She told 
police that she had been "ripping off" drugs 
from Swickey. 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to 
suppress the vial and other contents seized 
from her purse. The motion was accompanied 
by a memorandum of points and authorities. 
The state filed a memorandum opposing def-
endant's motion to suppress, and requested a 
ruling on defendant's motion. On March 17, 
1989, the court issued a written order denying 
defendant's motion. 
Defendant waived her right to a jury trial, 
and a bench trial commenced on March 21, 
1989. During the trial defendant again 
renewed her motion to suppress. The basis of 
her argument was that the search warrant was 
defective since the supporting affidavit did not 
support the nighttime or "no-knock" auth-
orization. The state argued that "Mr. Swickey 
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would be the only one to have standing to 
object to that," and also argued the merits of 
the claim. The court denied the renewed 
motion. Defendant was convicted as charged. 
Defendant raises three issues on appeal, all 
of which challenge the district court's failure 
to suppress the items seized from defendant's 
purse: 1) Whether there was sufficient factual 
information in the supporting affidavit to 
authorize a nighttime search, 2) whether there 
was sufficient factual information in the sup-
porting affidavit to authorize a "no-knock" 
search, and 3) whether the search was defec-
tive since the warrant was dated subsequent to 
the search.2 
"NO-KNOCK" SEARCH 
Defendant argues there was insufficient 
factual information presented in the suppor-
ting affidavit to justify the inclusion of a "no-
knock" provision in the search warrant. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (1990) provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
When a search warrant has been 
issued authorizing entry into any 
building, room, conveyance, com-
partment or other enclosure, the 
officer executing the warrant may 
use such force as is reasonably 
necessary to enter: 
(2) Without notice of his autho-
rity and purpose, if the magistrate 
issuing the warrant directs in the 
warrant that the officer need not 
give notice. The magistrate shall so 
direct only upon proof, under oath, 
that the object of the search may be 
quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted, or that physical harm may 
result to any person if notice were 
given. 
The affiant in this case requested a warrant 
to search for narcotics believed located in a 
residence, by checking a preprinted provision 
on the affidavit form. A "no-knock" warrant 
was requested based on the affiant's statement 
that such narcotics could be easily destroyed. 
Defendant argues that this statement alone is 
insufficient to justify issuance of a "no-
knock" warrant. However, reading the affid-
avit "in a common sense manner and as a 
whole," State v. Paul, 225 Neb. 432, 405 
N.W.2d 608, 610 (1987) (quoting People v. 
Mardian, 47 Cal. App. 3d 16, 35, 121 Cal. 
Rptr. 269, 281 (1975)), we conclude that the 
magistrate had sufficient basis to issue a "no-
knock" warrant. 
Although the affidavit is sparse, it is clear 
that the object of the search was drugs located 
in a residence. The small amount of drugs 
ordinarily found in a residential setting can be 
easily and quickly destroyed with even the 
briefest notice. Therefore, issuance of a "no-
UTAH 
Rowe ^ 
v. Rep. 12 13 
knock" warrant is justified if the affidavit 
suggests that a small, readily disposable, 
quantity of drugs in a residence is the object 
of the search.3 The magistrate can readily and 
properly infer that such drugs could be quickly 
destroyed if notice is given. State v. Spisak, 
520 P.2d 561 (Utah 1974); State v. Miller, 740 
P.2d 1363 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). While a 
detailed and factually specific affidavit is 
commendable and may facilitate subsequent 
review by an appellate court, it is not strictly 
necessary for the officer to elaborate on the 
obvious in the affidavit. 
NIGHTTIME SEARCH 
Defendant also argues that the supporting 
affidavit lacked sufficient factual information 
to support a nighttime search. Utah Code 
Ann. §77-23-5(1) (1990) provides in pert-
inent part: 
The magistrate must insert a direc-
tion in the warrant that it be served 
in the daytime, unless the affidavits 
or oral testimony state a reasonable 
cause to believe a search is neces-
sary in the night to seize the prop-
erty prior to it being concealed, 
destroyed, damaged or altered, or 
for other good reason; in which 
case he may insert a direction that it 
be served any time of the day or 
night. 
Previous Utah case law on this issue construed 
a different code provision which required that 
a warrant be served in the daytime "unless the 
affidavits are positive that the property is on 
the person or in the place to searched." Utah 
Code Ann. §77-54-11 (1953). See, e.g., State v. 
Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 
846, 848-49 (1972). No Utah cases are drawn 
to our attention which have addressed the 
present code provision. 
The showing required by the present statute 
focuses not upon a positive showing that the 
property is at the place to be searched, but 
upon whether there are special circumstances 
which would justify a search at night. The 
statute does not specify how elaborate or 
detailed this showing must be, but merely 
requires that the "affidavits or oral testimony" 
must support a "reasonable cause" determin-
ation that a nighttime search is necessary. The 
precise quantum of information which would 
support this determination is not defined in 
the statute or in Utah case law and, as has 
been observed elsewhere, it is difficult "to 
anticipate all of the numerous factors that 
may justify the authorization of a nighttime 
search." People v. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 749 
P.2d 803, 810, 244 Cal. Rptr. 48, cert, denied, 
109 S.Ct. 188 (1988). Nonetheless, the statute 
clearly requires a particularized showing either 
that 1) a search is required in the night 
because the property is on the verge of being 
<CE REPORTS 
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"concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered/ 
or 2) "for other good reason/ Utah Code 
Ann. §77-23-5(1) (1990). 
Defendant argues that this particularized 
showing was not made in this case. We agree. 
Nothing in the supporting affidavit supported 
the inclusion of the nighttime service authority 
other than the preprinted language referred to 
above and the information received from the 
confidential informant. Contrary to our view 
that little more is required to justify a "no-
knock" warrant than that the search is for 
narcotics at a residence, we see nothing inhe-
rent in a narcotics search which would neces-
sitate a search at night, even though circums-
tances can easily be imagined which would 
suggest the propriety of such a search being 
made at night.4 
In interpreting a similar statutory provision 
which allows a magistrate to authorize a nig-
httime search upon a showing of "good 
cause," one appellate court observed: 
(1) A magistrate cannot make a 
neutral and independent determin-
ation of whether authorization of 
nighttime service is necessary when 
faced with only conclusory and 
ambiguous allegations in the affid-
avit; and (2) an affiant's averment 
that in his experience (generally) 
particular types of contraband are 
easily disposed of does not, in 
itself, constitute a sufficient 
showing for the necessity of a nig-
httime search: a particular and 
specific reason for nighttime service 
must be set forth. 
People v. Mardian, 47 Cal. App. 3d 16, 34, 
121 Cal. Rptr. 269,281 (1975). 
In Mardian, the court held that the magis-
trate had "good cause" to issue a nighttime 
search warrant based on information provided 
in the affidavit that the contraband was in the 
process of being removed from the premises, 
and that the occupants would be able to 
remove the remainder of the contraband 
before a daytime warrant could be served since 
the occupants would be leaving at 6:00 a.m. Id. 
at 282. See also Kimble, 749 P.2d at 810 
(magistrate could infer that persons who had 
recently stolen stereo equipment would 
attempt to get rid of it quickly, since the theft 
was tied to a double homicide); State v. Paul, 
225 Neb. 432, 405 N.W.2d 608 (1987) 
(affiant's statement that he smelled a strong 
odor of burnt marijuana coming from inside 
the residence in the afternoon supported an 
inference that marijuana was being consumed 
and thus destroyed). See generally Annotation, 
Propriety of Execution of Search Warrant at 
Nighttime, 26 A.L.R.3d 951 (1969 & Supp. 
1990), 1 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Pro-
cedure §166 (13th ed. 1989); 2 W. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure §4.7(b) (2d ed. 1987 & 
Supp. 1990). 
The affidavit in this case contained no facts 
from which a magistrate could infer that the 
contraband was likely to be destroyed, conc-
ealed, damaged, or altered during the night. 
Additionally, we find nothing in the affidavit 
from which a magistrate could reasonably 
infer that there was any "other good reason" 
to justify issuance of a nighttime search 
warrant.5 We therefore hold that it was error 
for the magistrate to authorize a nighttime 
search based on the facts in the affidavit pre-
sented to him. 
STANDING, ABANDONMENT, "GOOD 
FAITH," AND SUPPRESSION 
The state argues that any inadequacy in the 
warrant is immaterial since 1) defendant has 
no standing to challenge the adequacy of the 
warrant to search Swickey's apartment since 
she was only a guest in the apartment; 2) any 
expectation of privacy she had in the contents 
of her purse was abandoned when she told the 
officer she had everything that was hers when 
she departed Swickey's bedroom, leaving the 
purse behind; 3) any technical defects in the 
warrant were overcome by the officer's good 
faith reliance on the warrant in conducting the 
search; and 4) any failure of the warrant to 
satisfy merely statutory requirements does not 
necessitate the suppression of evidence, as 
would be the case where constitutional requi-
rements are offended. 
A. Standing 
In her reply brief, defendant claims the state 
did not raise standing at trial. While we reaf-
firm that such a failure would be fatal to the 
state's position, see State v. Marshall, 791 
P.2d 880, 885-86 & n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), defendant's claim is not borne out by 
the record. As indicated above, the prosecutor 
specifically argued that "Mr. Swickey would 
be the only one to have standing to object to 
[the nighttime and "no-knock" provisions of 
the warrant]." 
Since the contention was adequately raised 
at trial, we now address the state's standing 
argument. The state argues that defendant has 
no standing to challenge the adequacy of a 
warrant authorizing the search of a third-
party's home since she was only a party guest 
in the home. We disagree. 
Since the decision in Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 
S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), it 
has been the law that "capacity to 
claim the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment depends ... upon 
whether the person who claims the 
protection of the Amendment has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 
430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). A 
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subjective expectation of privacy is 
legitimate if it is ["]one that society 
is prepared to recognize as 
'reasonable,!'"] id. at 143-144 
n.12, 99 S.Ct. at 430 n.12, quoting 
Katz, supra, at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 1687 
(1990). The state's position that defendant 
failed to establish standing based on the 
nature of her presence in Swickey's home is 
arguable, but not compelling. 
In Olson, the Supreme Court concluded 
"that Olson's status as an overnight guest is 
alone enough to show that he had an expect-
ation of privacy in the home that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable." Id. at 
1688. In this case, the evidence did not esta-
blish that defendant was an overnight guest in 
Swickey's home on the night of the search. 
There is, however, uncontroverted evidence 
that defendant had an intimate relationship 
with Swickey, which may have continued to 
the time of the incident giving rise to this case, 
and had stayed overnight in the home on 
several prior occasions. However, the record 
lacks facts which would lead to the conclusion 
that she intended, or might have been invited, 
to remain overnight on the night of the search. 
But as we read Olson, there is no talismanic 
significance, in determining standing, to the 
length of time a social guest is in the home. 
Olson squarely holds that an overnight guest 
has such standing, but nothing in Olson sug-
gests that a social visit of a duration less than 
overnight would deprive a guest of standing. 
While an overnight stay may connote a qual-
itatively greater expectation of privacy than 
some social visits, given the typical characte-
ristics of overnight stays such as showering, 
changing clothes, and the use of toilet facili-
ties, the distinction is really more one of 
degree than of kind. For example, the seclu-
sion extended to a parent who pauses to feed 
or diaper an infant while visiting friends 
implies a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
although the visit might be a short one, and 
certainly less than an overnight stay. Visitors 
of comparatively short duration may nap, 
change, use the toilet, or dine without any 
expectation of interference from the world at 
large. In this case, defendant felt secure 
enough in the home to remove her shoes, leave 
her purse beyond her view, and roam to 
rooms other than where her fellow guests were 
playing cards. Eschewing an analysis based on 
free access and right to exclude others, the 
Olson Court focused on the social tradition 
that 
hosts will more likely than not 
respect the privacy interests of their 
guests, who are entitled to a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy despite 
the fact that they have no legal 
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interest in the premises and do not 
have the legal authority to deter-
mine who may or may not enter the 
household. 
Id. at 1689. 
A standing challenge in the search and 
seizure context is resolved by a determination 
of "whether governmental officials violated 
any legitimate expectation of privacy." Rawl-
ings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S . 98, 106 (1980). We 
conclude that defendant's status as an invited 
guest in the home vested her with a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the home and she 
thereby gained sufficient standing to challenge 
the validity of the search warrant and the 
resulting search. 
B. Abandonment 
The state argues that even if defendant 
might otherwise have standing to challenge the 
search warrant, she abandoned the purse, and 
thus abandoned any standing she might othe-
rwise have had to challenge the search which 
resulted in seizure of her purse. We disagree. 
"When individuals voluntarily abandon 
property, they forfeit any expectation of 
privacy in it that they might have had." United 
States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 845 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. 
Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 464 U.S. 859 (1983)). However, 
"abandonment must be distinguished from a 
mere disclaimer of a property interest made to 
the police prior to the search, which under the 
better view does not defeat standing." United 
States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 763-64 (8th 
Cir. 1984) (quoting 3 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure §11.3, at 548-49 (1978)). 
Whether defendant had abandoned her 
purse, under search and seizure analysis, is 
primarily a factual question of intent to vol-
untarily relinquish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, which may be inferred from "words 
spoken, acts done, and other objective facts." 
Thomas, 864 F.2d at 846 (quoting United 
States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 
1973)). See also Gurgel v. Nichol, 19 Utah 2d 
200, 429 P.2d 47, 48 (1967) (abandonment 
ordinarily a question for the factfinder to be 
determined from the facts and circumstances). 
The burden of proving abandonment falls on 
the state, People v. Contreras, 210 Cal. App. 
3d 450, 259 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (1989), and 
must be shown by "clear, unequivocal and 
decisive evidence." Friedman v. United States, 
347 F.2d 697, 704, (8th Cir. 1965). See also 
United States v. Boswell, 347 A.2d 270, 274 
(D.C. 1975); O'Shaughnessy v. State, 420 So. 
2d 377, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). It "is 
measured from the vantage point" of the 
defendant, and not the police. Narain v. State, 
79 Md. App. 385, 556 A.2d 1158, 1161 n.4 
(1989). "It is only the [defendant's] state of 
mind that counts." Id. 
Defendant was allowed to leave the party 
. Rowe 
idv. Rep. 12 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
State v 
16 154 Utah A 
along with Swickey's other guests. She was 
conducted to the bedroom to retrieve her 
shoes and was given the opportunity to claim 
any other property belonging to her. When 
asked by the police officer if anything else 
belonged to her, she stated that she had retr-
ieved everything in the bedroom that was hers. 
That repudiation of interest in property 
located in the bedroom is consistent with a 
conclusion of abandonment. It is not, 
however, inconsistent with a conclusion of a 
mere disclaimer of interest to avoid self-
incrimination. The • state failed to produce 
evidence which would develop this issue and 
perhaps meet its burden of proving abandon-
ment under search and seizure analysis. Acc-
ordingly, abandonment in the Fourth Amen-
dment sense was not established by the state.6 
C. Good Faith 
The state further claims the search can be 
validated by the officer's good faith reliance 
on the deficient warrant. United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-23 (1984). In Leon, 
the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary 
rule, aimed at deterring unlawful police 
conduct,7 does not bar evidence obtained by 
officers acting in good faith reliance on a 
defective warrant.* Id. But the Leon doctrine 
is not without limitations. When the magist-
rate reviewing the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant is not presented with sufficient 
facts to determine probable cause, the warrant 
cannot be relied upon by searching officers. Id. 
at 915. We have determined that there was 
nothing in the affidavit in this case that would 
offer any basis to the magistrate for a finding 
of probable cause to allow a nighttime search. 
It appears from the record that the endorse-
ment of the nighttime authorization was done 
in impermissible "rubber stamp" fashion. See 
Aguilarv. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964). 
The question of the officer's good faith 
reliance is subject to de novo determination by 
this court. United States v. Frietas, 800 F.2d 
1451, 1454 (9th Or . 1986). The conduct of the 
officers executing the search warrant must be 
objectively reasonable. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919. 
Police officers cannot ignore an unambiguous 
statutory directive to present the magistrate 
with "reasonable cause to believe a search is 
necessary in the night," Utah Code Ann. §77-
23-5(1) (1990), and then claim that their very 
failure to do so is objectively reasonable 
conduct on their part. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 
919 n.20 (objective standard requires reason-
able knowledge of the law by police officers); 
United States v. Freitas, 650 F. Supp. 1560, 
1572 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (police agency must 
train officers, who have obligation to ensure 
that warrant comports with constitutional 
law), afPd, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986). In 
this case, the same officer prepared the affi-
davit, secured the warrant, and executed the 
search.9 He had personal knowledge of the 
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affidavit's contents. This further persuades us 
that reliance on the warrant cannot be termed 
"reasonable" and thus the Leon exception does 
not apply in this case. 
D. Appropriate Remedy 
Having so concluded, we must now turn our 
attention to whether the warrant's issuance in 
violation of the nighttime search requirements 
necessitates suppression of the evidence seized, 
namely the drugs and other items found in 
defendant's purse. We recognize that mere 
ministerial and technical errors in the prepar-
ation or execution of search warrants will not, 
without more, invalidate the warrant. See, e.g., 
State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 702-03 (Utah 
1988) (violation of "knock-and-announce" 
rule did not require suppression when no one 
was at home at the time of the search to 
respond to the knock). Cf. State v. Kirn, 70 
Haw. 206, 767 P.2d 1238, 1239-40 (1989) 
(suppression may be appropriate for violation 
of constitution, statute, or administrative 
regulation). 
However, where a statute establishes proc-
edures for protection of -substantive rights, 
such as section 77-23-5 does, violation of 
the statute cannot be dismissed as technical or 
ministerial in nature and suppression of the 
evidence gained from the challenged search is 
the appropriate remedy. Away a v. State, 5 
Haw. App. 547, 705 P.2d 54, 59 (seizure of 
evidence not particularly described in the 
warrant required suppression), cert, denied, 67 
Haw. 685, 744 P.2d 781 (1985); Wiggin v. 
State, 755 P.2d 115, 117 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1988) (violation of statute similar to section 77-
23-5 mandates suppression); Stare v. Coyle, 
95 Wash. 2d 1, 621 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1980) 
(suppression required for violation of notice 
requirement). But see State v. Brock, 294 Or. 
15, 653 P.2d 543, 545-46 (1982) (warrant 
allowing nighttime search without any showing 
of reasonable necessity not invalid and supp-
ression not required, when legislature had 
considered and declined to enact specific exc-
lusionary rule for such circumstances). 
The historical character of a nighttime 
search further persuades us that violation of 
the statute requires suppression. See Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) 
(question of reasonableness of a search must 
be viewed not only from the particular facts, 
but also with an eye toward what was consi-
dered reasonable at the time of the adoption 
of the Fourth Amendment). Searches of 
homes were soundly condemned by the draf-
ters of the Bill of Rights and under English 
common law.10 See United States ex rel. 
Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897-98 (3d 
Cir. 1968). "Night-time search was the evil in 
its most obnoxious form." Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167, 210 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). The propriety of executing a 
search of an occupied dwelling at night is 
NCE REPORTS 
, Rowe 
dv Rep 12 
CODE • CO State v. 
Provo, Utah 154 Utah A 
"sensitively related to the reasonableness" 
prong of the Fourth Amendment. United 
States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 1326 (10th 
Cir. 1979). See also State v. Lindner, 100 
Idaho 37, 592 P.2d 852, 857 (1979) ("entry 
into an occupied dwelling in the middle of the 
night is clearly a greater invasion of privacy 
than entry executed during the daytime"). 
We hold that an unmitigated violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-5 (1990), as is 
present in this case, requires suppression of all 
evidence gained in the search executed purs-
uant to the defective warrant.M 
CONCLUSION 
The warrant was unlawful insofar as it 
authorized a search at night. Defendant has 
standing to challenge that deficiency by virtue 
of her status as a guest in the home. The 
unlawful search cannot be saved on "good 
faith" or abandonment grounds. It follows 
that the evidence found in defendant's purse 
should have been suppressed. Her conviction 
is accordingly reversed and the case is rema-
nded for a new trial. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
GARFF, Judge (concurring): 
I concur in the main opinion but make three 
further comments. First, one should not con-
strue the main opinion so broadly as to guar-
antee every person invited into a home the 
type of privacy protected by the fourth ame-
ndment. Any number of possibilities arise 
where one might be classified as an "invited 
guest," but may not necessarily be entitled to a 
constitutional expectation of privacy. For 
example, a Fuller Brush sales person, invited 
into a home to demonstrate a product, may 
not have standing to challenge an illegal search 
warrant. The emphasis in Olson, as here, is 
that the circumstances that create a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the home must be 
such that society is prepared to recogmze them 
as reasonable. That determination is fact 
sensitive and the test need not be overly 
complex. In Olson it was the mere fact that 
defendant was an overnight guest. As an 
overnight guest, he had the reasonable expec-
tation that he and his possessions would not 
be disturbed by anyone, and that when he was 
asleep and most vulnerable, he would be safe 
from any unwarranted intrusion. Although 
here we are not sure whether defendant was 
intended to be an overnight guest, circumsta-
nces suggest that she was in a more privileged 
position in the house than a casual, card 
playing guest: she had a close relationship with 
the home owner, had been there on other 
occasions, had free run of the house, and felt 
comfortable enough to "make herself at 
home," in a literal sense. 
The second point I would make is that 
whenever a "canned," or preprinted affidavit 
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is presented to a magistrate, he or she has an 
affirmative responsibility to scrutinize the 
factual circumstances justifying the search 
warrant. Conclusory or ambiguous statements 
in the affidavit are insufficient. This is parti-
cularly critical when the warrant authorizes 
nighttime intrusion into a person's home. 
Finally, while the analysis in the Appendix 
to our opinion is good food for thought in a 
case where the state has argued the applicab-
ility of the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule, in joining the court's opinion I 
emphasize its narrow application, and in no 
sense intimate any view on whether the Leon 
exception does or does not make good policy, 
much less on whether it should or not have 
any vitality under our state constitution. Those 
questions are reserved for another day. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
I DISSENT: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
APPENDIX 
The Leon Court, perhaps alarmed at 
society's prospects of failure in the so-called 
"drug war," premised the good faith exception 
on expediency. The Court concluded that the 
exclusionary rule's sole purpose was to deter 
police misconduct. This view minimizes the 
history of the adoption of the Fourth Amen-
dment and the development of the exclusio-
nary rule itself. Origins of the Fourth Amen-
dment are based not so much upon law enfo-
rcement misconduct in executing warrantless 
searches, as in concerns about the unreason-
able issuance of general search warrants. The 
exclusionary rule was born as a constitutional 
remedy for violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment generally, with no particular emphasis on 
police behavior. 
General Warrants 
General warrants have their derivation in 
thirteenth century universal authorizations 
granted to innkeepers to search guests for 
counterfeit currency. Stengel, The Background 
of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, Part One, 3 U. Rich. L. 
Rev. 278, 283 (1969). With the onset of the 
Age of Enlightenment and accompanying 
reform movements, England's threatened 
monarchs issued sweeping general warrants to 
search papers, books, and documents for 
evidence of sedition and libel against the 
Crown. For nearly a century, members of the 
private printer's guild used these warrants to 
seize and destroy the presses of printers who 
failed to join their union. Stewart, The Road 
to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, 
Development and Future of the Exclusionary 
Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 
Colum. L. Rev. 1365,1369(1983). 
James I, Charles I, and Charles II, rulers 
during the seventeenth century, instituted 
unprecedented general warrants allowing 
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agents of the notorious Court of the Star 
Chamber to search virtually at any time and 
any place for seditious printed matter. See Mar-
cus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 726 
(1961). Tax collectors were granted general 
warrants to enter castles and cottages, at any 
time without notice, to enforce the hearth tax. 
Not until a revolution which placed a reform 
king, William of Orange, upon the throne, 
and a suit for trespass by a member of Parli-
ament, did judicial review effectively limit the 
reach of general warrants. Chief Justice Pratt 
(Lord Camden) concluded in Wilkes v. Wood, 
98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763): 
The defendants claimed a right, 
under precedents, to force persons 
houses, break open escrutores, seize 
their papers & c. upon a general 
warrant, where no inventory is 
made of the things thus taken away, 
and where no offenders names are 
specified in the warrant, and ther-
efore a discretionary power given to 
messengers to search wherever their 
suspicions may chance to fall. [Such 
power] is totally subversive of the 
liberty of the subject. 
Id. at 498. See also Entick v. Carrington, 95 
Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). These cases were known 
to the authors of the Fourth Amendment, and 
Wilkes v. Wood is generally regarded to be the 
formative inspiration for the passage of the 
Fourth Amendment. See Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616,631 (1886). 
Colonial Writs of Assistance 
In the American colonies, particular excep-
tion was taken to the practice of granting writs 
of assistance to customs officers. These writs, 
granted by King George II, were valid for the 
King's lifetime and granted unlimited power 
to the officers to search at any place and any 
time without the need for judicial review or 
subsequent proceedings. Stewart, The Road to 
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, 
Development and Future of the Exclusionary 
Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 
Colum. L. Rev. 1365,1370(1983). 
In 1760, King George II died and new writs 
were required. The colonists sought judicial 
relief from the new writs. James Otis, a pro-
minent attorney in the service of the Crown 
whose position required him to seek the writs 
from the Superior Court, instead resigned his 
post and argued the cause on behalf of sixty-
three Boston citizens. N. Lasson, The History 
and Development of the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution 58-59 
(1937, Johns Hopkins Press; reprinted 1970, 
DaCapo Press). Years later, John Adams 
claimed it was James Otis's fiery denunciation 
of general warrants in open court that prov-
ided the spark for the American Revolution. Id. 
This historical review suggests that the iss-
uance of flawed warrants was of greater 
concern to the drafters of the Fourth Amen-
dment than was the conduct of officers 
charged with the duty to execute such warr-
ants. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 
316 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (describing 
the text of the original draft of the Fourth 
Amendment). 
The Exclusionary Rule 
An exclusionary rule was first applied in Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). It 
is instructive that Boyd involved no issue of 
police action or misconduct. The challenge in 
Boyd was to a judicially-issued subpoena in a 
civil forfeiture case. Paralleling the circumst-
ances under which the writs of assistance were 
condemned, Boyd involved a subpoena for 
books and papers of merchants accused of 
unlawfully importing glass. Id. at 621. The 
Supreme Court concluded that because the 
papers were sought for what was essentially a 
criminal process, forfeiture for customs duties, 
the Fourth Amendment applied. However, the 
Court did not order suppression directly on 
Fourth Amendment grounds. Rather, the 
Court reasoned that the forced production of 
incriminatory papers and documents would 
violate the Fifth Amendment and accordingly 
ordered suppression of the material obtained 
under the subpoena. 
Twenty-two years later, a unanimous 
Court decided Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383 (1914), which firmly established the 
exclusionary rule as a fundamental principle of 
Fourth Amendment law. Defendant Weeks 
had been convicted of gambling, on the basis 
of personal papers which were unlawfully 
seized. Before trial, Weeks moved for the 
return of his illegally seized papers. The Court 
held that the government was constitutionally 
bound to return the improperly seized docu-
ments, which could not then be subpoenaed by 
the prosecution, and reversed Weeks' convi-
ction. Id. at 398. See also Schrock & Welsh, Up 
From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as 
a Constitutional Requirement, 59 Minn. L. 
Rev. 251, 295-308 (1974) (discussing the 
impact of the Weeks decision). 
A few years later, the Court decided Silve-
rthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 
U.S. 385 (1920), and Gouled v. United States, 
255 U.S. 298 (1921). The combined cases 
framed the exclusionary rule as barring any 
use whatsoever of improperly seized evidence. 
Writing for the Court in Si'/verthorne, Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes stated: "The essence of 
a provision forbidding the acquisition of evi-
dence in a certain way is that not merely evi-
dence so acquired shall not be used before the 
Court but that it shall not be used at all." 251 
U.S. at 392. Ultimately, and after further 
refinement, the Fourth Amendment exclusio-
nary rule was applied to the states through the 
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Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643,655 (1961). 
Against this background, it would seem 
appropriate that courts considering the scope 
of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule be 
mindful of the process of review and issuance 
of the warrant, as well as the lawfulness of the 
police officer' s execution thereof. 
The Trouble with Leon 
It is viewed from this historical perspective 
that United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984), represents such a qualitative change in 
the development of exclusionary rule jurispr-
udence. Writing for the Court, Justice White 
offered three justifications for the conclusion 
that the exclusionary rule was aimed at police 
misconduct and had no impact on the judicial 
review of warrant applications. First, he dec-
lared that the exclusionary rule was not desi-
gned to deter judges from error. Id. at 916. 
"Second, there exists no evidence suggesting 
that judges and magistrates are inclined to 
ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment ...." 
Id. Finally, and "most important," judges are 
neutral judicial officers, not adjuncts to law 
enforcement administration, and the exclusi-
onary rule will have no practical deterrent 
effect on them. Id. at 916-17. 
The first and third assertions seem at odds 
with the fact that the exclusionary rule, as first 
"designed" in Boyd, was expressly created as a 
remedy for judicial error. Moreover, these 
assertions discount the historical concerns 
about the issuance of general warrants and 
writs of assistance. In the instant case, there is 
no allegation of police misconduct in the 
warrant application process. The defect in the 
warrant might have been easily cured by 
careful questioning by an attentive magistrate. 
This is likely the more common scenario when 
a warrant's validity is challenged. See State v. 
Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 58, 67 
(1990). Often the reviewing judge will simply 
evaluate the warrant application for gross 
errors of law or something out of the ordi-
nary, acting, in effect, as a rubber stamp. See 
Goldstein, The Search Warrant, the Magist-
rate, and Judicial Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1173, 1182(1987); Wasserstrom <ft Mertens, The 
Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But 
Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 Am. Grim. L. Rev. 
85, 108-09 (1984) (citing statistical evidence 
of lax warrant review standards). Much of the 
exclusionary rule's vigor prior to Leon was in 
requiring the magistrate to assiduously exercise 
his or her Fourth Amendment duty by caref-
ully scrutinizing warrant applications. 
Justice White's second assertion, if true, 
calls into serious question the practical need 
for the Leon exception to the exclusionary 
rule. He gives high marks to judges and 
magistrates, claiming that few issue warrants 
not firmly grounded in probable cause. If 
indeed this is so, but see id., the exclusionary 
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rule would almost never be invoked in warrant-
based searches, even without the Leon doct-
rine, since the magistrate will have scrutinized 
the application and issued the warrant only 
upon a detailed and well-supported showing 
of probable cause. Thus, the societal costs of 
the exclusionary rule, a great concern for the 
Leon Court, will be minuscule in the context 
of cases where a warrant is obtained. 
It may additionally be questioned whether 
the societal costs of the exclusionary rule are 
as onerous as Justice White believes them to 
be. The Leon Court reasoned that the 
"marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by 
suppressing evidence ... cannot justify the 
substantial costs of Exclusion." 468 U.S. at 
922. But several scholars who have examined 
Leon's "economic" conclusions refute them as 
groundless in fact. See Nardulli, The Societal 
Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 1987 
U. 111. L. Rev. 223, 239 (exclusionary rule 
accounts for less than two percent of case 
attrition); 1 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure 
§1.3 at 46 n.5 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1990). 
Moreover, while the societal cost of suppres-
sing evidence may in some respects be more 
tangible-it surely prompts an understand-
able visceral reaction by many--the 
system's use of illegally obtained evidence is 
not without societal costs of its own. True, it 
may be, that freeing a criminal because the 
constable (or magistrate) erred is not an enti-
rely satisfactory state of affairs. But in a 
society committed to the notion that govern-
mental action as well as citizen behavior is 
subject to the rule of law, it should also be 
regarded as an unsatisfactory state of affairs 
to countenance the use of evidence that should 
not have been uncovered, under our rules, to 
convict a citizen of some crime. 
We believe the exclusionary rule may well 
have, as a substantial purpose, the objective of 
requiring careful judicial scrutiny of warrant 
applications. Simply put, it is unlikely magis-
trates are any more pleased to have their 
warrants "thrown out" by reviewing courts 
than are the police to have their evidence 
"thrown out." Such stimulation extends also 
to appellate review. Rigorous appellate review 
of search warrants and the accompanying 
benefit of defining search and seizure law 
would be effectively precluded if Leon were 
given wide rein, as the court would have little 
occasion to proceed beyond an inquiry into 
the trial court's finding of the officer's good 
faith. Similarly, issuing magistrates who are 
less than zealous in their devotion to the 
Fourth Amendment would have little motiva-
tion to look beyond the face of the warrant, 
knowing that as long as the warrant is facially 
proper, the appellate court would not interfere 
in view of the officer's good faith in executing 
a facially proper warrant. 
Were an officer permitted to rely on a fac-
ially valid warrant without more being requ-
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ired of him or her, there would be no incen-
tive for advanced training which would enable 
officers to better fulfill their duty to uphold 
the constitutions of the United States and of 
this state. Moreover, the well-trained officer 
or prosecutor securing a warrant will be in a 
position to prevent the very harm which led to 
the good faith exception. An officer who is 
motivated to prepare a constitutionally adeq-
uate warrant application will be less likely to 
rush through a warrant application, and will 
more carefully evaluate the sufficiency of 
probable cause, so that the warrant will wit-
hstand ultimate review and not merely gain the 
signature of an issuing magistrate. Similarly, 
the prosecutors who must argue the validity of 
warrants in court will be circumspect in their 
assessment of the sufficiency of probable 
cause when asked for advice before a warrant 
application is presented. 
Fourth Amendment Conclusion 
It may be persuasively argued that the exc-
lusionary rule serves purposes beyond influe-
ncing the behavior of individual officers and 
officials. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 975-80 (1984) (Stevens, J. dissen-
ting) (noting justifications for exclusionary 
rule not tempered with "good faith" exception 
as also including assurance of some remedy 
for violation of constitutional rights and as 
placing judiciary beyond the "dirty business" 
of using the fruits of unlawful searches to 
secure convictions). But insofar as its purpose 
is to influence behavior, the rule can serve to 
promote discipline, thoroughness, and care on 
the part of all actors in the process-police 
who secure warrants, prosecutors who aid in 
that process, magistrates who issue warrants, 
and police who execute warrants. Any excep-
tion to the rule which focuses on the rule's 
impact on only one of those groups, officers 
who carry out searches, is open to legitimate 
criticism. 
As and when the appellate courts of this 
state are squarely confronted with the question 
of whether the exclusionary rule existing by 
virtue of Article I, Section 14, of the Utah 
Constitution is subject to a Leon-type "good 
faith" exception, a healthy skepticism should 
permeate the courts' consideration in view of 
the troublesome analysis in Leon. 
1. While the date on the search warrant and supp-
orting affidavit is October 8, 1988, it is clear from 
trial testimony that this was an error, and the date 
of issuance was actually October 7. 
2. Defendant addresses the third contention in a 
cursory, one paragraph argument. She cites no 
authority for her position that the erroneous date 
invalidates the warrant, nor does she respond to 
testimony given at trial that the date the warrant 
was issued was actually October 7, 1988. We there-
fore decline to address this issue. 
3. A more particularized showing may well be req-
uired if, for example, a large quantity of drugs is 
UTAH ADVA 
Rowe CODE* co 
v. Rep. 12 Provo, Utah 
sought. In such cases, as where the affiant has inf-
ormation of the on-going cultivation or manufac-
ture of drugs, the exigency of ready destructability, 
inherent with small quantities of drugs, may not be 
present. 
4. For example, if the supporting affidavit made a 
particularized showing that drugs were likely to be 
sold or consumed over the course of the night and 
evidence thereby lost, or that the supply was likely 
to be imminently moved en masse to a different 
location during the night, or that a safer search was 
likely at night because the house was abustlc with 
activity during the day and no one but the occupant 
was likely to be home at night, then the propriety of 
a nighttime search becomes manifest. We caution 
that a mere incantation of such circumstances will 
not justify a nighttime search-the required 
factual showing is not one which is conducive, for 
example, to preprinted language. Officers must 
"state a reasonable cause to believe a [nighttime] 
search is necessary ...." Utah Code Ann. §77-23-
5(1990). 
5. Though we find it unnecessary to define what 
"other good reason'' might encompass, but see note 
4, supra, clearly one reason why a nighttime search 
might be authorized is where a nighttime search 
would increase the safety of the officers executing 
the warrant or the safety of the general public. 
Of course, ordinarily a nighttime search would 
pose a heightened safety risk since people may tend 
to overreact to an entry by force in the dead of 
night. Darkness may exacerbate the reaction or 
heighten the confusion inherent in a search, especi-
ally one conducted on a "no-knock" basis. None-
theless, a specific showing that the safety of the 
public or the officers will be increased has been held 
a sufficient basis for a search at night. See, e.g., Kim-
ble, 749 P.2d at 810 (magistrate could conclude 
that permitting police to expedite their investigation 
was an exceptionally compelling reason to allow a 
nighttime search where dangerous killer or killers 
were still at large). We note that other courts have 
rejected less compelling kinds of "other good 
reason," such as because "appellant did not get 
home until '6:00 or after* and that appellant was 
not always present at his house," People v. Watson, 
75 Cal. App. 3d 592, 595, 142 Cal. Rptr. 245, 246 
(1978); because the officerapplying for the warrant 
"was on duty at night," Wiggin v. State, 755 P.2d 
115, 116-17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); and because 
"it [was] unknown when the person described [in the 
affidavit] will be at the premises." State v. Lien, 265 
N.W.2d 833, 840 (Minn. 1978). 
6. It is not entirely clear that even if the state had 
proven abandonment defendant would be deprived 
of standing to challenge the seizure of her purse. 
"Property abandoned as a direct result of an unla-
wful intrusion into a person's right to be free from 
governmental interference cannot be lawfully 
seized." State v. Nichols, 563 So. 2d 1283, 1286-87 
(La. Ct. App. 1990). See also United States v. 
Roman, 849 F.2d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041, 1045 (6th Cir. 
1982), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983); State v. 
Jones, 553 So. 2d 928, 931 (La. Ct. App. 1989); 
Sarain v. State, 79 Md. App. 385, 556 A.2d 1158, 
1160-61 (1989); State v. Heuther, 453 N.W.2d 778, 
781-82 (N.D. 1990); State v. Whitaker, 795 P.2d 
182, 183 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). Under this view, 
even if defendant abandoned her purse, she still 
would have standing since the abandonment was 
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in which her purse was located. 
7. Many have questioned the Leon Court's narrow 
interpretation of the exclusionary rule's purpose. See, 
e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928-
60 (1984) (Brcnnan, J., dissenting); id. at 960-80 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); State v. Novembrino, 105 
N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820, 853-57 (1987); 1 W. 
LaFave, Search & Seizure §1.3, at 46 n.5 (1987) 
(citing extensive critical authority); Wasserstrom & 
Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: 
But Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85, 
106-07 (1984). See also State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 
181, 185 & n.2 (Utah 1987) (criticizing the breadth 
of the language in Leon). The Leon rationale, 
viewed from a historical perspective, is treated at 
greater length in the Appendix to this opinion. 
8. We note that neither party addressed Utah's 
exclusionary rule, premised on Article I, Section 14, 
of the Utah Constitution. See State v. Larocco, 794 
P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990) ("exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of 
police violations of article I, section 14."). To date, 
neither the Utah Supreme Court nor this court has 
held that a parallel doctrine to the Leon exception 
would apply in the context of Utah's exclusionary 
rule. See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 187 (Utah 
1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (Court has not 
yet considered Leon-type exception under Article I, 
Section 14, of the Utah Constitution). See also State 
v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 809 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (concluding in dicta that Mendoza did not 
invalidate applicability of Leon). Many state courts 
have determined that exclusionary rules existing by 
virtue of state constitutional provisions are not 
subject to a Leon-type "good faith" exception. See, 
e.g., State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 
58, 68 (1990); People v. Sundling, 153 Mich. App. 
277, 395 N.W.2d 308, 315 (1986), appeal denied, 
428 Mich. 887 (1987); State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 
370 S.E.2d 553 (1988); State v. Novembrino, 105 
N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820, 857 (1987); People v. 
Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 457-58 
(1985). At least one court has construed a statutory 
exclusionary rule to reject the Leon exception. See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 370 
n.5,476 N.E.2d 548, 554 n.5 (1985). 
Notwithstanding any dicta to the contrary in our 
decision in State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 809 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), it is far from clear whether 
the Leon exception has any vitality under a state law 
analysis, especially since the basis and scope of our 
state exclusionary rule is somewhat unsettled. See 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472-73 (Utah 
1990). There may well be sound reasons for state 
court interpretation at variance with the federal 
search and seizure rules. See generally, Durham, 
Employing the Utah Constitution, 2 Utah B.J. 25 
(Nov. 1989); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 
(Utah 1988). See also State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 
104-05 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Billings, J., concu-
rring and dissenting) ("[sjtate courts responding to 
the confusing and restrictive new federal interpret-
ations are relying on an analysis of their own search 
and seizure provisions to expand constitutional 
protection beyond those mandated by the fourth 
amendment, often directly avoiding applicable 
United States Supreme Court precedent"). 
9. We hasten to caution that the objective reasona-
bleness of both the affiant officers and the executing 
officers must be considered in any review where the 
Leon doctrine is asserted. Were a subterfuge to be 
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employed to insulate the affiant from actual service 
of the warrant in order to support a claim of good 
faith reliance by executing officers, we would not 
hesitate to fashion an appropriate remedy. See State 
v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring) (where officers purp-
osefully serve a search warrant in order to avoid 
giving notice of authority and purpose, court will 
fashion a judicial remedy). 
10. In an often-quoted speech condemning general 
warrants, Lord Chatham stated: 
The poorest man may, in his cottage, 
bid defiance to all forces of the Crown. 
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the 
wind may blow through it; the storm 
may enter; but the King of England may 
not enter; all his forces dare not cross 
the threshold of the ruined tenement. 
1 T. Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitat-
ions 611 (8th ed. 1927). See also Appendix to this 
opinion. 
11. It may well be that section 77-23-5 merely 
codifies that which is already required under the 
Fourth Amendment. See Gooding v. United States, 
416 U.S. 430, 464 (1974) (Marshall J., dissenting) 
(principle of requiring a showing of particularized 
need to conduct a nighttime search may now be a 
"constitutional imperative"). See also State v. 
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 codifies constituti-
onal requirements for investigative stops). But see 
Davis & Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the 
Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops in 
Utah, 3 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 357, 363 (1989) (section 
77-7-15 requirement is more strict than the 
Fourth Amendment). 
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Before Judges Bench, Jackson and Orme (On 
Law and Motion). 
This matter is before the Court upon app-
ellee's motion to allow Todd Utzinger, a law 
student, to argue on behalf of appellee at the 
hearing scheduled herein on 20 February 1991. 
Appellant stipulated to the motion. 
The law student assistance rule, Rule 11-
301 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professi-
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